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STUDENTS OR SERFS? IS MANDATORY
COMMUNITY SERVICE A VIOLATION OF
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT?
It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon.'
I. INTRODUCTION
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction."2 With the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
in 1865, these words and their "declaration of the personal free-
dom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of the govern-
ment ' 4 became part of the Constitution of the United States.
In recent years, however, the Thirteenth Amendment and its
guarantee of personal freedom has been under attack as the na-
tion's high schools and graduate schools have implemented
"mandatory community service" programs These mandatory
community service programs require students to perform an aver-
age of forty to sixty hours of community service for "approved"
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
3. The Thirteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in January 1865 and
ratified by the states in December of that year. See PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN
SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 207 (1993).
4. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,69 (1872).
5. See Cynthia L. Brennan, Comment, Mandatory Community Service as a High
School Graduation Requirement: Inculcating Values or Unconstitutional?, 11 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 253, 253-54 & n.6 (1994) (discussing the growing trend of including
mandatory community service requirements in high schools); see also Stephen F. Be-
fort & Eric S. Janus, The Role of Legal Education in Instilling an Ethos of Public
Service Among Law Students: Towards a Collaboration Between the Profession and
the Academy on Professional Values, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 5-6 & n.28 (1994)
(indicating that of 177 ABA approved law schools, "17 schools had [pro bono] pro-
grams which are or soon would be 'mandatory,' and 31 schools reported pro bono
programs which are 'an elective component of the curriculum for credit"').
6. See, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 1996)
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nonprofit organizations The schools compel this service by
threatening to withhold a student's diploma.8
As would be expected, mandatory community service is not
without its critics.9 The arguments against mandatory community
service include claims that mandatory community service pro-
grams violate students' rights under the First, Ninth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and also interfere with parents' rights to raise their' children.
Within the past five years, three separate lawsuits, Steirer v.
Bethlehem Area School District," Immediato v. Rye Neck School
District,12 and Hemdon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Board of Educa-
tion 3 have questioned the constitutionality of mandatory com-
munity service. For a variety of reasons, the courts in each case
held that a mandatory community service requirement does not
violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
4
(requiring 40 hours of community service in order to satisfy graduation require-
ment).
7. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp.
1443, 1446-47, 1456-57 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (describing a typical mandatory community
service program and listing the types of agencies which qualify for public service).
8. The threat of losing one's diploma is a very effective means by which a school
can coerce a student to perform labor. Consider that in a recent Census Bureau re-
port it was found that, "while a high school grad can expect to earn $821,000 over the
course of a working life-age 25 to 64-a bachelor's degree recipient can expect to
earn more than $1.4 million, and a professional degree recipient more than $3 mil-
lion." Michelle Healy, Time (In School) Is Money, USA TODAY, July 22, 1994, at
ID. In addition, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers without college
degrees face much higher levels of unemployment-20.3 percent versus 5.8 percent
for 1994 graduates-and rapidly decreasing real earnings-the average inflation-
adjusted earnings of high school graduates dropped 30 percent between 1973 and
1990. Therefore, a high school student who refuses to do 40 hours of community
service may lose the potential to increase lifetime earnings by an estimated minimum
of $600,000, a cost of approximately $15,000 for each hour of community service not
performed.
9. As Justice Jackson stated: "Probably no deeper division of our people could
proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine
and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in em-
bracing." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
10. See, e.g., Herndon, 899 F. Supp. at 1447, 1449, 1453; Immediato, 873 F. Supp.
at 847-48; Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 789 F. Supp. 1337, 1341, 1346 (E.D.
Pa. 1992). The issues raised regarding the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and parents' rights are beyond the scope of this Comment.
11. 789 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affid, 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993).
12. 873 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. 899 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
14. See, e.g., Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460 (holding that the program is not so ex-
ploitative as to constitute involuntary servitude); Steirer, 987 F.2d at 1000 (holding
that there is "no basis in fact or logic" to conclude the program is involuntary servi-
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This Comment argues that mandatory community service pro-
grams offend the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude. Part I of this Comment examines
the legislative purpose behind the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Part II describes how the courts have struggled to
define the meaning and conditions of the term "involuntary servi-
tude." Part III explains the "public service exception" to the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Part IV discusses the Steirer, Immediato, and
Herndon decisions and criticizes the courts' rulings as improper,
unfounded, and offensive to the spirit of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Part V discusses the difficulty of developing any particular
definition expanding the meaning of involuntary servitude but
suggests some criteria for courts to consider when deciding future
cases. Finally, Part VI concludes that mandatory community
service should be prohibited by the courts.
II. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Slavery was a major factor leading up to the Civil War.'5 The
war, which ended four years to the day after it began,16 was the
bloodiest conflict in American history, resulting in the death of
tude); Herndon, 899 F. Supp. at 1448-49 (holding that mandatory community service
has none of the undesirable incidents of slavery); Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 851
(citing Steirer, 987 F.2d at 1000); Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1345-46 (holding that the
program is excepted because it provides a public service).
15. As the Union expanded, free-that is non-slave-Northern states and slave
Southern states marched parallel across the West. See PETER BATTY & PETER
PARISH, THE DIVIDED UNION: THE STORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN WAR, 1861-65,
at 13 (1987).
[B]y 1819 the number of free and slave states was evenly balanced at eleven
each. Since each state, no matter what its size, had equal representation in
the Senate, the more powerful of the two legislative bodies that comprised
Congress, a united South could effectively block or at least delay legislation
from the lower House of Representatives, where representation was based
on population. This parity in the Senate was enormously important to the
South, particularly when the North's superiority in numbers had given the
non-slave states a clear majority in the House of Representatives.
Id. at 14-15.
"As long as it maintained its parity in the Senate the South could thwart the
passage of legislation considered harmful to its interests." Id. at 32.
"By... 1848 the tally of free and slave states was fifteen each." Id. Thereaf-
ter, as the nation expanded-with the addition of California in 1850, Minnesota in
1858, and Oregon in 1859 as non-slave states, id. at 39-and a growing anti-slavery
sentiment began to prevail, especially with regard to the status of future states, id at
44, "Southerners feared being condemned to a perpetual minority, their influence
forever in decline, and hence began to consider whether their interests might be bet-
ter served outside the Union than within it." Id.
16. See id. at 196.
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620,000 soldiers-360,000 Union and 260,000 Confederate.17 "On
every level the war changed the United States radically.... But
the greatest impact was the ending of slavery and with it the total
change in the Southern way of life."' 8 Thus,
the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-
establishing the authority of the Federal government were
not content to permit this great act of emancipation to
rest on the actual results of the contest .... [T]hey de-
termined to place this main and most valuable result in
the Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fun-
damental articles. Hence the thirteenth article of
amendment of that instrument.i9
The Thirteenth Amendment is but the first of what are com-
monly known as the "Civil War Amendments, 2' which were re-
quired to be ratified by each of the former rebel states as part of
the Reconstruction of the Union.21
It has been argued that the Thirteenth Amendment's sole
purpose was to rid the United States of the slavery practiced in the
southern states prior to the conclusion of the Civil War.2 How-
ever, had Congress intended only to rid the country of southern
slavery, Congress need not have included the words "involuntary
servitude" in the text of the Amendment, 3 Because the broader
scope of the prohibition includes involuntary servitude, it is clear
that the amendment was more than just a "one-idea proposition." 24
17. See id. at 198.
18. Id. at 199.
19. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68-69 (1872).
20. See Daniel M. Kolkey, The Constitutional Cycles of Federalism, 32 IDAHO L.
REV. 495,495 (1996).
21. See GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY 760-63 (4th ed. 1996). The language of the Thirteenth Amendment was
borrowed from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and is sometimes attributed to a
proposal made by Thomas Jefferson under the Articles of Confederation. See Lau-
ren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of
a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 373-74 & n.8 (1995). Although legislators de-
bated the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment both prior to and after its ratifica-
tion, they gave relatively little consideration to the actual language used. See Lea S.
VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
437,448-50 (1989).
22. See VanderVelde, supra note 21, at 476-78.
23. See id. at 448-50.
24. Id. at 449 n.67. VanderVelde has postulated that although both terms were
included in the language of the Amendment, the terms "slavery" and "involuntary
servitude" developed their meanings at separate times: "[A]bolishing 'involuntary
servitude' was more forward-looking than abolishing 'slavery.' The term
[Vol, 30:809
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Legislator's comments during the debates both prior and subse-
quent to the Amendment's ratification strongly support this the-
ory.2s Thus, it appears that in ratifying the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Congress envisioned that the Amendment would serve to
"maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor
throughout the United States." 6
A. What is Involuntary Servitude?
"[T]he Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy collection of
words .... ,27 Yet, while the purpose of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment appears clear from its brief language, the courts, in applying
the language of the Amendment, struggle when attempting to de-
termine the exact definition and conditions that create an
"involuntary servitude."' As recently as 1988, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that, "[w]hile the general spirit of the phrase
'involuntary servitude' is easily comprehended, the exact range of
conditions it prohibits is harder to define." 29
1. Defining "involuntary servitude"
In the Slaughter-House Cases," Justice Miller, writing for the
majority, stated, "[tihe word servitude is of larger meaning than
slavery."" However, Justice Miller limited this interpretation of
the word "servitude" to extend only so far as to include
"apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been practiced in the
West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English gov-
ernment, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs at-
tached to the plantation."32 In dissent, Justice Field interpreted the
language of the Thirteenth Amendment to have a much broader
scope. He explained:
A person allowed to pursue only one trade or calling, and
only in one locality of the country, would not be, in the
[involuntary servitude] could not be defined before the abolition of slavery because
the worst case of involuntary servitude, slavery, would dominate the discourse." Id.
at 452-53.
25. See id. at 453 (noting the theoretical shift in congressional debate pre- and
post-passage).
26. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944).
27. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,227 (1971).
28. See Kares, supra note 21, at 374-75.
29. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988).
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
31. Id. at 69.
32. Id.
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strict sense of the term, in a condition of slavery, but
probably none would deny that he would be in a condi-
tion of servitude. He certainly would not possess the lib-
erties nor enjoy the privileges of a freeman. The compul-
sion which would force him to labor even for his own
benefit only in one direction, or in one place, would be
almost as oppressive and nearly as great an invasion of his
liberty as the compulsion which would force him to labor
for the benefit or pleasure of another, and would equally
constitute an element of servitude.33
Thirty-four years after Slaughter-House, Justice Brewer, writ-
ing for the Court in Hodges v. United States,3 boldly stated that the
meaning of the language of the Thirteenth Amendment "is as clear
as language can make it. The things denounced are slavery and in-
voluntary servitude .... All understand by these terms a condi-
tion of enforced compulsory service of one to another.,
3
1
Yet, despite Justice Brewer's opinion that the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment was unmistakably clear, case history
shows that for as many cases in which a claim of involuntary servi-
tude is made, there are nearly as many interpretations of the
term.
36
In 1988, in United States v. Kozminski37 the Court once again
visited the issue of involuntary servitude. In Kozminski, two de-
fendants, Mr. and Mrs. Kozminski, were accused of holding two
farm workers in involuntary servitude by "us[ing] various coercive
measures-including denial of pay, subjection to substandard liv-
ing conditions, and isolation from others-to cause the victims to
33. Id. at 90-91 (Field, J., dissenting).
34. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
35. Id. at 16. Justice Brewer further stated: "A reference to the definitions in the
dictionaries of words whose meaning is so thoroughly understood by all seems an
affectation .... " Id. at 17.
36. See, e.g., Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328,332 (1916) ("compulsory labor akin to
African slavery"); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) ("control by which
the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit");
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905) ("Slavery implies involuntary servi-
tude-a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the con-
trol of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence
of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and services."); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,542 (1896) ("the control of the labor and services of one man
for the benefit of another"); Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 50 ("much more
than the abolition or prohibition of African slavery").
37. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
[Vol. 30:809
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believe they had no alternative but to work on the farm."38 At
trial, the jury found both Mr. and Mrs. Kozminski guilty of violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 1584, two federal statutes en-
acted by Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.39
On first appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the verdict of the lower court, finding the Kozminskis guilty
of violating both statutes. However, the court eventually reversed
the conviction holding that "the District Court's definition of in-
voluntary servitude, which would bring cases involving general
psychological coercion within the reach of § 241 and § 1584, was
too broad."4
The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict be-
tween the various circuits as to the meaning of involuntary servi-
tude "for the purpose of criminal prosecution under § 241 and §
1584."4 The Court in Kozminski held that,
for purposes of criminal prosecution under § 241 or
§ 1584, the term 'involuntary servitude' necessarily means
a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to
work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical re-
straint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coer-
cion through law or the legal process.42
The Court reached this decision because "the language and legis-
lative history of § 1584 both indicate that its reach should be lim-
ited to cases involving the compulsion of services by the use or
threatened use of physical or legal coercion." 43
What is perhaps of most importance is the fact that the defini-
38. 1& at 936.
39. See id. at 937. Section 241, in relevant part, provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimi-
date any person in any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same...
. They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994). Section 1584 provides: "Whoever knowingly and willfully
holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude,
any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18
U.S.C. § 1584 (1994). Congress is granted the power to pass such legislation by sec-
tion 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("The Con-
gress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
40. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 937-38.
41. Id. at 939 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 948.
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tion of involuntary servitude decided upon by the Kozminski
Court was specifically intended for use in interpreting the statutes
in question. Further, the definition of involuntary servitude ac-
cepted in Kozminski was by no means intended to serve as the ex-
clusive reading of those words outside of the statutory context. As
Justice O'Connor explained, "[t]he guarantee of freedom from in-
voluntary servitude has never been interpreted specifically to
prohibit compulsion of labor by [means other than the use of
physical or legal coercion], such as psychological coercion.
[However, we] draw no conclusions.., about the potential scope
of the Thirteenth Amendment."45
2. What conditions constitute an involuntary servitude?
The determination of what conditions create an involuntary
servitude is related to the attempt to define involuntary servitude.
As with the definition of involuntary servitude, courts have taken
different approaches in determining the conditions that are re-
quired.
In United States v. Shackney,4' the defendant contracted with a
family of Mexican workers, in the United States on visas, to work
on his farm in Connecticut.47 When the family wished to be re-
leased from their contract, the defendant threatened to use his in-
fluence to have the family or its individual members deported.48
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that, for the purpose
of evaluating 18 U.S.C. § 1584, "[t]here must be 'law or force' that
'compels performance or a continuance of the service.' 49 There-
fore the court held that:
[A] holding in involuntary servitude means.., action by
the master causing the servant to have, or to believe he
has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement...
not a situation where the servant knows he has a choice
between continued service and freedom, even if the mas-
ter has led him to believe that the choice may entail con-
sequences that are exceedingly bad.... While a credible
44. See id. at 944 (stating that the Court was interpreting the Thirteenth
Amendment through "the narrow window that is appropriate in applying § 241").
45. Id. at 944.
46. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
47. See id. at 477.
4& See id. at 479.




threat of deportation may come close to the line, it still
leaves the employee with a choice .... s'
Absent compulsion either by law or force, the court concluded that
a servitude could not be involuntary.
51
At least one court has expressed the view that the Thirteenth
Amendment can apply to compulsion by means other than threat
of legal coercion or force. In United States v. Mussry,52 a case
similar to Shackney, the defendants were charged with unlawfully
holding poor Indonesians against their will by withholding their
passports and return airline tickets, and requiring them to work off
the cost of their transportation to the United States.53 The district
court dismissed all counts because there was no showing of com-
pelled service by use of law or force.54 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, recognizing that "[c]onduct other than the use,
or threatened use, of law or physical force may, under some cir-
cumstances, have the same effect as the more traditional forms of
coercion--or may even be more coercive"5 thus constituting a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit, con-
sidering the Second Circuit interpretation in Shackney, believed
that "the most reasonable interpretation of Shackney is that a
holding in involuntary servitude may occur only when there is the
use, or threatened use, of law or physical force," 6 but reasoned
that "a test that looks to the use of law or physical force at-
tempt[ing] to draw a clear line between lawful and unlawful con-
duct.., is too narrow to fully implement the purpose of the 13th
amendment.. .. "7
Additionally, some courts have focused on the ability to es-
cape the servitude as being the essential element of a Thirteenth
Amendment violation. In Flood v. Kuhn, 8 Curtis Flood, an out-
50. Id. at 486. The court went on to indicate that its decision was so rendered
because it did not see "how [the court] could fairly bring [a threat of deportation]
within [the criminal statute] without encompassing other types of threat, quite as
devastating. . . as that of deportation ... whose inclusion would make the statute an
easy tool for blackmail and other serious abuse." Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added).
51. See id at 487.
52. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
53. See id. at 1450.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 1453.
56. Id. at 1452.
57. Id.
58. 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
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fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals baseball club, was traded to the
Philadelphia Phillies baseball club.59 Flood refused to report to
Philadelphia in violation of his contract and the "reserve clause"
contained therein." Flood claimed that enforcement of the reserve
clause, under which he was "forbidden to negotiate toward pro-
spective baseball employment with any club other than the one to
whom he is under contract," violated the Thirteenth Amendment's
protection against involuntary servitude.61 In ruling that the re-
serve clause did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, the court,
quoting from its Shackney decision, held that "[a] showing of com-
pulsion is [a] prerequisite to proof of involuntary servitude.,
6
Therefore, although the choice Flood was confronted with,
whether or not to continue in baseball, was "a consequence to be
deplored," the baseball reserve system was not a form of involun-
59. Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 271.
60. See id. In order to play major league baseball, all players were required to
sign a Uniform Player's Contract, which included the reserve clause. See id. at 273-
74. The reserve clause included "a number of baseball rules, regulations and uni-
form contract terms which together operate[d] to bind a player to a ball club and re-
strict[ed] him to negotiating with that club only." Id. at 272. It is interesting to note
the similarities between the reserve clause and the practices of former slaveholders
following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. The former slaveholders,
attempting to circumvent the effects of the Thirteenth Amendment, created a system
of private and legal arrangements by which no former slaveholder would hire the ex-
slave of any other slaveholder, effectively assigning ex-slaves to the former slave-
holders. See VanderVelde, supra note 21, at 490-92. This system was widely con-
demned by Congress and the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment. See id.
61. Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 274. Flood also claimed that the reserve system as
implemented violated federal antitrust laws. See id. at 272. The lower court, and
later the Supreme Court, held that because Congress had exempted major league
baseball from the antitrust laws, it was up to Congress to remove the exemption
through proper legislation. See id. at 276-77 (citing Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)); see also, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (citing Tool-
son and Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)).
As a result of the player's strike of 1994, there have been a number of bills
introduced in Congress attempting to remove some or all of major league baseball's
antitrust exemption. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995,
S. 627, 104th Cong. (authored by Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah); Major League Baseball
Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, S. 416, 104th Cong. (authored by Sen. Strom Thur-
mond, R-S.C.); National Pastime Preservation Act of 1995, S. 15, 104th Cong.
(authored by Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y.); Major League Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1612, 104th Cong. (authored by Rep. Jim Bunning, R-
Ky.); Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 386, 104th Cong.
(authored by Rep. James A. Traficant, D-Ohio); see also Senate Judiciary Approves
Measure to Lift Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 150 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D10 (Aug.
4, 1995) (discussing S. 627, 104th Cong. (1995)).
62. Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 281.
63. Id.
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tary servitude because Flood was "not compelled by law or statute
to play baseball for Philadelphia.... [H]e ha[d] the right to retire
and to embark upon a different enterprise outside organized base-
ball." 4
Other courts have looked at the issue of compulsion and the
ability to escape in a less restrictive way. In United States v.
Mussryj6 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[t]he op-
portunity to escape, and even successful escape, is not enough in
and of itself to preclude a finding that a person was held in invol-
untary servitude."6' Under Mussry the crucial factor in determin-
ing the existence of an involuntary servitude is not whether the
complainant has an opportunity for escape but "whether a person
intends to and does coerce an individual into his service by subju-
64. Id. The court of appeals, reviewing the lower court's decision, stated that
"[i]nasmuch as plaintiff retains the option not to play baseball at all, his Thirteenth
Amendment argument is foreclosed by this court's decision in United States v.
Shackney, a decision which we adhere to as sound." Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264,
268 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation omitted).
The Second Circuit's decision in Flood directly reversed the earlier decision
of American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914), which was later
cited with approval by the Second Circuit in Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 410
(2d Cir. 1949).
In Chase, the New York Supreme Court held that an injunction preventing a
baseball player from playing for any team other than the one with whom he had
previously been under contract was involuntary servitude. See Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at
14.
The Chase court viewed the player's ability to escape quite differently than
did the Flood court. The Chase court did not accept the escape argument, reasoning
instead that a player "has no recourse" because "[h]e must either take the contract..
or resort to some other occupation." Id. at 13.
In refusing to uphold the injunction the court stated:
If a baseball player... desires to be employed at the work for which he
is qualified and is entitled to earn his best compensation, he must submit to
dominion over his personal freedom and the control of his services by sale,
transfer, or exchange, without his consent, or abandon his vocation and
seek employment at some other kind of labor. While the services of these
baseball players are ostensibly secured by voluntary contracts a study of the
system... reveals the involuntary character of the servitude which is im-
posed upon players.., is so great as to make it necessary for the player ei-
ther to take the contract prescribed... or abandon baseball as a profession
and seek some other mode of earning a livelihood. There is no difference
in principle between the system of servitude [created by the contract],
which as has been shown, provides for the purchase, sale, barter, and ex-
change of the services of baseball players ... without their consent, and the
system of peonage brought into the United States.... The quasi peonage
of baseballplayers.., is contrary to the spirit of American institutions, and
is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
65. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 1454.
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gating the will of the other person.""
III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE EXCEPTION TO THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT
In deciding cases raising the issue of involuntary servitude,
courts have been willing to make an exception for those instances
in which the involuntary servitude complained of can be classified
as a "public need."'
The Supreme Court first discussed the "public service" excep-
tion to the Thirteenth Amendment in Robertson v. Baldwin.9
Robertson involved a number of seamen who had contracted to
work for one year aboard a private vessel." The men abandoned
ship and, pursuant to statute, were arrested and forced to return to
work on the ship until they completed their contract.71 The Court
reasoned that the statute under which the men were arrested and
forced to complete their contract did not violate the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.72 The
Court held that while the statute might fall within the letter of the
Amendment, it was not "within its spirit, a case of involuntary
servitude" ' 3 because such service had existed prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment.74
Justice Harlan, in dissent, recognized the flaw in the majority's
67. Id. at 1453.
68: See Kares, supra note 21, at 393-94.
69. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
70. See id. at 275-76.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 287-88.
73. Id. at 281. The Court first held that by entering into a contract for personal
service, the seamen could not be considered to have entered into such service invol-
untarily. See id. at 280-81.
74. The Court stated:
It is clear... that the amendment was not intended to introduce any novel
doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always
been treated as exceptional; such as military and naval enlistments, or to
disturb the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor
children or wards.... To say that persons engaged in a public service are
not within the amendment is to admit that there are exceptions to its gen-
eral language, and the further question is at once presented, where shall the
line be drawn? We know of no better answer to make than to say that
services which have from time immemorial been treated as exceptional
shall not be regarded as within its purview.
Id. at 282. The Court went on to catalogue the immemorial history of compulsory
maritime service, relying on such rules as the maritime law of the ancient Rhodians,
the Rules of Oleron promulgated by Henry III, and the Marine Ordinance of Louis
XIV. See id. at 283-88.
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reasoning, stating, "It is a... serious matter when the clear read-
ing of a constitutional provision relating to the liberty of man is
departed from in deference to what is called usage which has ex-
isted, for the most part, under monarchical and despotic govern-
ments."75 While rejecting the majority's contention that the Thir-
teenth Amendment did not affect those services that had been
treated as exceptional from time immemorial,76 Justice Harlan did,
however, acknowledge a public service exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment for military service.77
Once the Robertson Court created a public service exception
for those services that had existed from time immemorial, 78 it was
only a matter of time before subsequent courts found other im-
memorial public service exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Court next recognized an exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment for public service in Butler v. Perry.79 In Butler, the
Court upheld a Florida statute requiring all able-bodied men be-
tween the ages of twenty-one and forty-five to work no less than
sixty hours per year constructing roads and bridges throughout the
state." The Court held that forced labor for the construction of
roads was a public service, which had existed since Colonial times,
and therefore was not within the prohibition of the Thirteenth
Amendment."'
75. Id. at 302 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 282.
77. Justice Harlan stated:
The Army and Navy of the United States are engaged in the performance
of public, not private, duties. Service in the army or navy of one's country
according to the terms of enlistment never implies slavery or involuntary
servitude.... Involuntary service rendered for the public.., is not, in any
legal sense, either slavery or involuntary servitude.
Id. at 298 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 282.
79. 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
80. See id. at 329. It should be noted that the Florida statute allowed:
[P]ersons so subject to road duty... in lieu thereof may pay to the road
overseer on or before the day he is called upon to render such service the
sum of three dollars... the same to be placed to the credit of the road and
bridge fund and subject to the order of the Board of County Commissioners
for road and bridge purposes.
Id. at 329-30 (citing Chapter 6537, Laws of Florida (Acts of 1913, pp. 469, 474, 475)).
The Court could have viewed this provision of the statute as creating a tax
for road construction that provided the option of allowing taxpayers to work instead
of pay. Had the Court taken this approach, the Court would not have had to address
the Thirteenth Amendment issue since the statute could have been upheld under the
state's power to tax.
81. See id. at 331-33.
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Shortly after Butler, the Court was presented with a number of
cases involving the Thirteenth Amendment and compulsory mili-
tary service. In the Selective Draft Law Cases,2 the Court, holding
that compulsory military service was not a violation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment,3 stated:
As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to
compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objection
that it does not give power to provide for such men would
seem to be too frivolous for further notice.... [I]t must
be assumed that the authority to raise armies was in-
tended to be limited to the right to call an army into exis-
tence counting alone upon the willingness of the citizen to
do his duty in time of public need, that is, in time of war.
But the premise of this proposition is so devoid of foun-
dation that it leaves not even a shadow of ground upon
which to base the conclusion. 4
Further, the Court stated:
As we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exac-
tion by government from the citizen of the performance
of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the de-
fense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of
a war declared by the great representative body of the
people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary
servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth
Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that
82. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). The Selective Draft Law Cases were a compilation of six
cases, each challenging compulsive military service. See id. at 368.
83. See id. at 390.
84. Id. at 377-78. Congress derives its power to conscribe military service from
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the
power to "raise and support Armies" and to "provide and maintain a Navy." U.S.
CONSr. art. I, § 8. The Court reasoned that the Necessary and Proper Clause of Ar-
ticle I, which grants Congress the authority to "make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution... all... Powers vested by [the] Consti-
tution," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, provided Congress the power to conscribe
military service. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 376-77.
The power of Congress to conscript manpower for military service has been
upheld in numerous cases. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 467 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1972) (holding that a conscientious objector can be compelled to perform non-
combat duties); Bertelsen v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that doc-
tors, dentists, and allied specialist categories may not be exempted from the draft on
the grounds that the selection process is arbitrary or unnecessary); Heflin v. Sanford,
142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1944) (holding that a conscientious objector can be compelled
to perform non-combat duties).
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the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere state-
ment.85
While this opinion does not mention a public service exception to
the Thirteenth Amendment, in other draft cases courts have im-
plied that such an exception exists. For example, in Heflin v. San-
ford86 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that service in the
military is work of national importance and that the Thirteenth
Amendment "was never intended to limit the war powers of gov-
ernment or its right to exact by law public service from all to meet
the public need."'
Acceptance of the public service argument grew as several
courts were quick to find many other activities included within the
scope of the exception. Since Butler, courts have held that under a
public service exception, it is not a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition on involuntary servitude to require a
citizen to serve jury duty; to compel a witness to testify at a grand
jury proceeding;" or to require an attorney to represent a criminal
defendant pro-bono.9" Of critical importance, however, is the fact
that, as opposed to the public services in Robertson and Butler,
each of these cases involves a public service that is specifically
provided for in the language of the Constitution.9' Thus, it is clear
that the text of the Thirteenth Amendment provides no public
service exception. It is also quite certain that the Framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment were aware of the government's powers to
compel service under the various provisions of the Constitution
and had the Framers so desired, they could have eliminated any or
all such powers specifically. This concept is supported by the fact
that the Amendment specifically makes an exception for
85. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 390.
86. 142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1944).
87. Id. at 800.
88. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973).
89. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
90. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932); United States v. Dillon, 346
F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965). But see Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452
U.S. 18 (1981). In Lassiter, the Supreme Court held that compulsory representation
only applies to criminal cases and that there is no power to compel representation in
civil cases which do not involve potential prison confinement. See id. at 25.
91. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees a person the right to
"an impartial jury," "Assistance of Counsel," and a "compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Similar to the argument for military con-
scription made by the Court in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 377, it would
seem illogical for the Constitution to provide such guarantees while at the same time
eliminating the means by which Congress or the courts may effectuate them.
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"punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted."' As the court in Brooks v. Central Bank reasoned:
[W]hat would be the point in excluding from the opera-
tion of those words the forced labor of a convicted crimi-
nal? Ex hypothesi, such forced labor would not be invol-
untary servitude anyway, so why make it an exception? It
is a familiar rule of interpretation that language of excep-
tion implies that the thing excepted would otherwise be
within the general language, or as expressed by Chief
Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland [in 1827]:
If it be a rule of interpretation to which all assent,
that the exception of a particular thing from general
words, proves that, in the opinion of the lawgiver, the
thing excepted would be within the general clause,
had the exception not been made, we know of no rea-
son why this general rule should not be as applicable
to the Constitution as to other instruments. 94
Thus, the fact that the Amendment's Framers chose not to elimi-
nate any of the previously recognized constitutional obligations is
significant in that it clearly establishes that those obligations were
intended to co-exist with the Thirteenth Amendment, rather than
creating public service exceptions.
Allowing for public service exceptions that do not find support
in the text of the Constitution opens a veritable Pandora's box of
other involuntary servitudes, like mandatory community service,
which arguably fits under the exception!' For example, courts
have found that having students perform cafeteria duty provides a
public service and is excepted from the Thirteenth Amendment's
protection because "cafeteria duty allows the State to reap a fi-
nancial benefit, that is, the obviation of any necessity to hire, at
great expense, professional employees."96  Courts have similarly
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
93. 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 182 (N.D. Ala. June 14, 1982), overruled on
other grounds by Brooks v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 1340 (1983) (holding that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in addressing the constitutional issues sua sponte and
not first attempting to resolve the issue on nonconstitutional grounds).
94. Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
95. In fact, even slavery was considered by some to be a public service, described
as being "essential for [the slave's] own good and for.., the safety and security of
the people... and their estates." KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION
11 (1956).
96. Bobilin v. Board of Educ., 403 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (D. Haw. 1975).
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held that being compelled to assist an officer in the course of the
officer's official duties is a public service for which an exception
applies because "every citizen is bound to assist apublic officer in
making an arrest, when called upon to do so." These public
service exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment demonstrate the
truth of Justice Daniel's pronouncement in Smith v. Turner'98
"Once let the barriers of the Constitution be removed, and the
march of abuse will be onward and without bonds." 99
IV. MANDATORY COMMUNITY SERVICE ON TRIAL: STEIRER,
IMMEDIA TO, AND HERNDON
Within the past five years, three separate lawsuits, Steirer v.
Bethlehem Area School District,0 Immediato v. Rye Neck School
District,101 and Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of
Education,'°2 have questioned the constitutionality of mandatory
community service. In each case the courts, for a variety of rea-
sons, have held that a mandatory community service requirement
does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.0 3
In ruling that mandatory community service is not involuntary
servitude, the courts in Steirer, Immediato, and Herndon have re-
lied on four principal arguments. The first argument is that the
community service involved does not reach the level of offensive
conduct against which the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to
97. Williams v. State, 490 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Ark. 1973). In Williams, the court was
persuaded by the argument that the Arkansas statute requiring private citizens to
assist police officers in the execution of their duties was constitutionally valid as a
result of its having existed for a long period without question. See id. The court
summarily rejected the argument that compelled assistance of a police officer was a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, without ever examining the merits of the
argument. See id. at 122. In the court's opinion, "that the statute requires involun-
tary servitude... requires no discussion, except to say that surely the responsibilities
of a citizen in this republic have not been so diminished and diluted that such a the-
ory can be viewed as having any substance whatever." Id.; cf. State v. Floyd, 584
A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1991) (upholding a similar statute on other grounds, never ad-
dressing the issue of involuntary servitude).
98. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848).
99. Id. at 518.
100. 789 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 987 F.2d 989 (3rd Cir. 1993).
101. 873 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).
102. 899 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
103. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460; Steirer, 987 F.2d at 1000; Herndon, 899 F.
Supp. at 1448-49; Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 851; Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1345-46.
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protect.1' 4 The second argument is that mandatory community
service is not within the ambit of the Thirteenth Amendment's
protection because the programs provide a public service. 5 The
third argument is that mandatory community service is not invol-
untary servitude because the program serves an educational pur-
pose. '  Finally, proponents of mandatory community service ar-
gue that participation in a mandatory community service program
is not involuntary servitude because the student's participation is
voluntary; the student retains the right and ability to withdraw
from the school thereby avoiding or escaping the servitude.Y",
In the discussion which follows, it is clearly demonstrated that,
with regard to mandatory community service, the arguments ac-
cepted by the courts either completely lack legal merit or misapply
legal precedent.
A. Mandatory Community Service Is Not Involuntary Servitude
Because It Is Not the Type of Conduct Against Which the
Thirteenth Amendment was Meant to Protect
The courts in Steirer, Immediato, and Herndon primarily re-
lied on the Kozminski definition of involuntary servitude in ruling
that mandatory community service is not involuntary servitude."'
Their reliance on the Kozminski definition of involuntary servi-
tude is, however, seriously misplaced. The Steirer, Immediato, and
Herndon cases each sought injunctive relief against the respective
school boards;' 9 no criminal statute was implicated. Reliance on a
criminal standard in a civil case is improper in that it unnecessarily
raises the standard by which the case will be decided."'
104. See Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 851.
105. See Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1345. This reasoning was not relied upon by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998.
106. See Steirer, 987 F.2d at 1000.
107. See Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1344 n.6.
108. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459; Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998; Herndon, 899 F. Supp.
at 1448; Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 850; Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1342.
109. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 454; Steirer, 987 F.2d at 989; Herndon, 899 F. Supp.
at 1443; Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 846; Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1338.
110. A major difference between a civil and a criminal case is the standard of
proof required to determine the case. "In a civil case, the plaintiff ... only has to
show by 'a preponderance of the evidence' that the facts alleged are true.... In a
criminal case, the prosecution has the much heavier burden of proving that the de-
fendant is guilty 'beyond a reasonable doubt."' THE COURT TV CRADLE-TO-GRAVE
LEGAL SURVIVAL GUIDE 195 (Little, Brown and Co. 1995); see also SAMUEL W.
MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE JURY SYSTEM 48-49 (1964)
(discussing burdens of proof).
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It is true that mandatory community service is not the same as
that form of slavery practiced prior to the Civil War."' However, a
mandatory community service program, in which a school board
dictates for whom the student will work and what wage the student
may earn, is very much like the "black codes" instituted subse-
quent to the emancipation of the slaves in an attempt to
"relegateo blacks to a status somewhere between slave and free
[by] . . .restrict[ing] blacks' occupations, ownership of property,
and access to the judicial system ... [and] enabl[ing] officials to
impose forced labor on 'vagrants.' 2 Thus, with regard to manda-
tory community service "[i]t may be that it is the obnoxious thing
in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and uncon-
stitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of proce-
dure."' Therefore, whether the court rationalizes that "[t]he
work required is not severe: students must perform only forty
hours of service in four years.... [and] the nature of the work re-
quired and conditions under which it must be performed are
hardly onerous;"1' 4 that "[t]he amount of service required, an aver-
age of 10 hours per year, and the flexible conditions under which
the service can be performed, do not appear ruthless;""' or that
"[t]here is nothing... to indicate that the conditions under which
the students work are unreasonable or oppressive .... [The stu-
dents] have a great deal of free time otherwise to do as they
wish, ' 6 is irrelevant. It is the fact that performance is coerced
that violates the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment.
111. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460 ("the mandatory community service program
is not, on the whole, 'compulsory labor' which 'in practical operation' produces
'undesirable results' analogous to slavery") (citation omitted); Steirer, 987 F.2d at
1000 ("There is no basis in fact or logic which would support analogizing a manda-
tory community service program in a public high school to slavery."); Herndon, 899
F. Supp. at 1449 ("The requirements of the Program are not 'in any sense compara-
ble to the odious practice the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to eradicate.' To
regard the Program, possessing none of the undesirable incidents of slavery, as vio-
lative of the Thirteenth Amendment would 'trivialize the great purpose of that char-
ter of freedom."' (citation omitted)).
112. KOLCHIN, supra note 3, at 209-10; see also BATrY & PARISH, supra note 15, at
205 (discussing the black codes).
113. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
114. Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460.
115. Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 851.
116. Herndon, 899 F. Supp. at 1449.
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B. Mandatory Community Service Is Not Involuntary Servitude
Because It Provides A Public Service
Some courts have been willing to accept the argument that
mandatory community service provides a public service and have
used this reasoning to hold that mandatory community service is
not a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.117 The courts which
have relied on the public service exception have relied on Bobilin
v. Board of Educationn8 for their authority. 9 In Bobilin, a public
school required its students to wash dishes in the school's cafete-
ria. 20 Failure or refusal to wash dishes resulted in suspension or
dismissal for one day.121 The district court first concluded that this
requirement conferred a public benefit because having students
wash dishes saved the state and its taxpayers the cost of hiring al-
ternative labor. 22 The court then compared the cafeteria duty to
those servitudes that it catalogued as being public service excep-
tions to the Thirteenth Amendment and concluded:
Clearly a requirement of potentially no more than one
day a month, or seven full days in one school year, a re-
quirement which operates in reality to require a maxi-
mum of three hours per day, and which averages 60 to 90
minutes for most students, does not rise to the magnitude
of involuntariness as dying unwillingly for one's country,
serving with little or no pay as a conscientious objector in
a labor camp during wartime, or working on the highways
without compensation.23
Justifying a school's forcing students to wash dishes because of
the value of that service to the taxpayers, as the court did in Bobi-
lin, demonstrates the truth of Justice Daniel's proclamation. 24 Ac-
ceptance of such attenuated logic to create an exception to a con-
117. Compare, e.g., Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1345 (accepting the reasoning that
mandatory community service provides a public service because it saves the taxpay-
ers money) with Steirer, 987 F.2d 998 ("Unlike the district court, we do not regard
the reasoning of Bobilin as 'persuasive,' because we are unprepared.., to accept the
proposition that the Thirteenth Amendment is inapplicable merely because the
mandatory service requirement provides a public benefit by saving the taxpayers
money." (citation omitted)).
118. 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975).
119. See Herndon, 899 F. Supp. at 1447; Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1345.
120. See Bobilin, 403 F. Supp. at 1097.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1104.
123. Id. at 1105.
124. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:809
MANDATORY COMMUNITY SERVICE
stitutional amendment is a prime example of unrestrained judicial
abuse of the Constitution.
C. Mandatory Community Service Is Not Involuntary Servitude
Because It Serves an Educational Purpose
Throughout the nation's history the Supreme Court has gen-
erally allowed local school boards "broad discretion in the man-
agement of school affairs, ' lu and has refused to "intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic con-
stitutional values."'6 Nevertheless, the Court has been firm in
recognizing that there remain "certain constitutional limits upon
the power of the State to control ... the curriculum and class-
room."1 27 For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska,iu the Court held un-
constitutional a state statute that prohibited the teaching of lan-
guages other than English. 29 In Epperson v. Arkansas,30 the Court
held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited teaching of evolu-
tion theory.
Similarly, while the Court has acknowledged the "compre-
hensive authority of the States and of school officials... to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools,"'' the Court has not
hesitated to protect constitutional freedoms that are "nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools,' '3 2 adher-
ing to the principal that "[n]either students [n]or teachers shed
their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse gate."'33 As the
Court has reasoned, the mere fact that schools "educat[e] the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Consti-
tutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the
125. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that there are some as-
pects of education, whether public or private, that the state unquestionably may
regulate).
126. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
127. Pico, 457 U.S. at 861.
128. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
129. See id. at 390-91.
130. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, the Court had no doubt that banning the
teaching of evolution theory was meant to promote biblical theories of Creationism
in contravention to "the mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth,
Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 109.
131. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
132. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487 (1960).
133. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes."'3' As a result,
the Court has held it unconstitutional to prohibit students from
wearing black armbands to protest a war;135 to deny a church group
equal access to school premises;' to allow a school to require par-
ticipation in invocation and benediction prayers as part of a
graduation ceremony;137 and, to require students to salute the
American flag.
38
Also at issue is whether mandatory community service in-
volves activities that are within the school's power to control. As
the Court stated in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District v. Pico, "[a school] might well defend [its] claim of
absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their
duty to inculcate community values. But... reliance on that duty
is misplaced where... [it] attempt[s] to extend [its] claim of abso-
lute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the class-
room." 39 Attempting, in a mandatory service program, to dictate a
student's employer and working conditions outside the school-
house gate is clearly beyond the authority of the school board.
Finally, mandatory community service is justified as being
educational because the programs:
* help students learn about the significance of rendering
service to their community;
" teach students about community organizations;
" teach students that their concerns about people and events
in the community can have positive effects;
* [allow students to] develop intellectual development and
academic learning in such areas as the expression of ideas,
reading and record-keeping;
" promote higher-level thinking skills such as open-
mindedness;
134. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
135. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
136. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (holding that denial of equal access to school facilities to a church group for
the showing of religion oriented films was speech discrimination in violation of the
First Amendment).
137. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
138. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
139. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion) (holding that a school's removal of
books from the school library was a violation of the First Amendment because stu-
dent use of the library was not a curriculum related activity).
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" enhance the skills of learning from experience; [and]
" [allow] students [to] learn about and be exposed to service-
related skills.'4
Proponents claim that because mandatory community service
provides such educational benefits it cannot be involuntary servi-
tude.' Assuming arguendo that mandatory community service is
educational but is involuntary servitude in violation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, there is simply no basis for a court to hold
that mandatory community service is excepted from that Amend-
ment's prohibition because of its educational benefits.
D. Mandatory Community Service Is Not Involuntary Servitude
Because the Student Has the Right to Attend a Private School or
Take the GED1 42
Proponents of mandatory community service argue that man-
datory community service is not involuntary servitude because at-
tendance at a school with a mandatory community service program
is voluntary. They argue that a student retains the option to attend
a private institution, engage in home schooling, or take the
GED.14' These options, however, are unrealistic. First, when one
considers that for the 1993-94 school year, the average cost of a
private high school education ranged from a low of $4,266 per stu-
dent, per year for a Catholic school offering both elementary and
secondary education, to a high of $9,525 per student, per year for a
140. Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 789 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
141. See Dennis D. Hirsch, No: Public Service Programs are Nothing Like Slavery,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 51, 51 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment is trivialized
when applied to such a beneficial educational program). Such statements are overly
simplistic and completely devoid of legal reasoning. If educational benefit were the
sole criterion for finding a program or institution outside the protection of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, slave plantations, which some considered "the best schools yet
invented for the mass training of that sort of inert and backward people," STAMPP,
supra note 95 at 11, would similarly fall outside the protection of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
142. See Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist, 73 F.3d 454,460 (2d Cir. 1996); Steirer,
789 F. Supp. at 1344. "The GED exam is the General Education Development exam
taken by nonmatriculated secondary students or adults who hope to earn a high
enough score on the exam to be awarded a high school diploma by the state depart-
ment of education." BORG HENDRICKSON, HOME SCHOOL: TAKING THE FIRST STEP
30 (1989).
143. See Steirer, 789 F. Supp. at 1344. The court in Herndon specifically rejected
this argument, holding such a distinction to be "'formalistic in the extreme."' Hern-
don v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Br. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (M.D.N.C.
1995) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,594 (1992)).
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non-sectarian school offering secondary education only,' 44 it be-
comes clear that the cost of private school may be so high as to ef-
fectively foreclose this option to many families.
Second, should the student decide to forgo high school alto-
gether and engage in home schooling or obtain a GED, other diffi-
culties may arise. The quality of the student's education may be
called into question by college admission boards or the student
may be saddled with the stigma of being a dropout.45 Either reac-
tion to the GED may result in serious economic difficulties for the
student.
Finally, as the Court has utilized the "doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions" to prohibit a state from conditioning the receipt
of a state benefit upon a waiver of a constitutional right,146 so
should the Court prohibit receipt of the benefit of a public educa-
tion 47 on a waiver of a student's Thirteenth Amendment rights.
As Justice Sutherland explained in Frost v. Railroad Commis-
sion:1"4
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act
of state legislation which, by words of express divestment,
seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the fed-
eral Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
144. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 72 (1995).
145. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 145, at 31 ("[S]ome employers will hesitate to
hire a GED graduate, because the employer may suspect that the graduate was a
high school dropout, and 'dropout' has uncomplimentary associations for many em-
ployers.").
146. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2317 (1994). In Dolan the Court
held that a city may not condition the receipt of a building permit upon the waiver of
a person's right to just compensation as guaranteed under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment absent a showing of an essential nexus between the benefit of re-
ceiving the building permit and the condition exacted by the city. See id. at 2316-17.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: "Under the well-settled
doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person
to give up a constitutional right... for a discretionary benefit." Id. at 2317. The
doctrine also has its critics. In Dolan, Justice Stevens explained: "Although it has a
long history, the 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine has for just as long suffered
from notoriously inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching principle
of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the
rights and powers in question." Id. at 2328 n.12.
147. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that educa-
tion, "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right.") (emphasis added);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304 (1978) (stating that admis-
sion to a state medical school is a state-provided benefit).
148. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
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result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a
right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state
threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to
challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state,
having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it
upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the
power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one
of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.
If the state may compel the surrender of one constitu-
tional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like man-
ner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence.
149
V. DECIDING MANDATORY SERVICE CASES IN THE FUTURE
A. Involuntary Servitude Means More Than Work Compelled by
Law or Force
Limiting a finding of involuntary servitude in civil cases to
those instances "in which the victim is forced to work for the de-
fendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury,
or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal proc-
ess,"' 50 deprives the Thirteenth Amendment of its full force and ef-
fect.
That argument [that involuntary servitude exists when
there is "compulsory labor" which, "in practical opera-
tion" produces '"undesirable results" analogous to slav-
ery"'] may be good advocacy, since it builds on our natu-
ral tendency to view the Thirteenth Amendment in terms
of the historical context in which it was enacted, but it is
most assuredly not good law. The argument.., is directly
contrary to the settled principle that the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude
reaches every situation in which "a worker must labor
149. Id at 593-94.
150. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
151. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460 (1996) (citing Kozminski,
487 U.S. at 942).
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against his will for the benefit of another. '" ' 2
As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in United States v. Mussry, 53
"the methods of subjugating people's wills have changed from bla-
tant slavery to more subtle, if equally effective, forms of coer-
cion."'4 After examining Steirer, Immediato, and Herndon, it is
painfully clear that a broader definition of involuntary servitude is
needed so that "civil cases [may] enjoy a more realistic assessment
of the coercive measures actually used ... to impose involuntary
servitude." 5
B. A New Definition of Involuntary Servitude?
The task of creating a broader definition of "involuntary servi-
tude" is "not an easy definitional question and it is one on which
reasonable minds and federal circuits might differ." '56 For exam-
ple, in Kozminski, four different constructions for the meaning of
involuntary servitude were offered, each focusing on a different
aspect of the issue. The Government argued for a broad construc-
tion of involuntary servitude, focusing their inquiry on whether the
victim is left with "no tolerable alternative but to serve the defen-
dant or [is] depriv[ed] ... of the power of choice."' 17 Justice Ste-
vens, in his concurring opinion, believed that a finding of involun-
tary servitude should be determined "in the common-law tradition
of case-by-case adjudication."' '58 The jury, according to Justice
Stevens, upon consideration of the "totality of the circumstances,"
should focus on "whether the victims' servitude was
'involuntary. '"" 59 Justices Brennan and Marshall believed that the
focus should be on whether the coercion results in "slavelike"
conditions.160 Justice Brennan explained that "[w]hile no one fac-
tor is dispositive, complete domination over all aspects of the vic-
tim's life, oppressive working and living conditions, and lack of pay
or personal freedom are the hallmarks of [a] slavelike condi-
152. Brooks v. Central Bank, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 182,188 (N.D. Ala.
June 14, 1982) (citation omitted).
153. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
154. Id, at 1452.
155. Kares, supra note 21, at 409.
156. United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1987) (Guy, J.,
dissenting).
157. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988).
158. Id. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 961 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tion..'' Finally, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, fo-
cused on the actions of the accused, explaining that an involuntary
servitude "encompasses those cases in which the defendant holds
the victim in servitude." 2 Thus, as Kozminski demonstrates, the
legislative task of "attempting to formulate an all-encompassing
definition of the term 'involuntary servitude' . . . is not an easy
one.
, ,I 3
After researching numerous involuntary servitude cases and
taking into consideration various approaches to redefining invol-
untary servitude, as suggested by the Justices in Kozminski, and
various scholarly articles,'6 it appears that attempting to create a
single, all-encompassing, exact definition of "involuntary servi-
tude" to be used in all cases is a Sisyphean task.'65 This is so pri-
marily because of the great variety of meanings and interpretations
available for "involuntary" and "servitude." Stated another way,
[t]he problem derives from the very nature of words.
They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical
symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a compli-
cated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate
precision. If individual words are inexact symbols, with
shifting variables, their configuration can hardly achieve
invariant meaning or assured definiteness. Apart from
the ambiguity inherent in its symbols, a statute suffers
161. Id. at 963 (Brennan, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 952.
163. Id. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring).
164. See, e.g., Kares, supra note 21, at 410-11 (suggesting the creation of a
"uniform balancing test"); Ann Penners Wrosch, Undue Influence, Involuntary Servi-
tude and Brainwashing: A More Consistent, Interests-Based Approach, 25 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 499,549-50 (1992) (recommending the adaptation of the susceptibility model
for undue influence); Harry H. Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need For A
More Flexible Approach, 19 RuTGERs L. REv. 65, 84 (1964) (placing the task of clari-
fying the meaning of "involuntary servitude" on the legislature).
165. According to Greek mythology,
Sisyphus [was a] King of Corinth, [who] saw a magnificent eagle bearing a
fair maiden to an island. The fair maiden was the stolen Aegina, beautiful
daughter of the river god Asopus, and the magnificent eagle was Zeus in
disguise. Sisyphus immediately told Asopus what he had seen, but by doing
so, he unfortunately incurred the wrath of Zeus. Zeus condemned Sisyphus
to roll a large rock up a hill, whereupon the rock would roll down the other
side of the hill, forcing Sisyphus to roll the rock back up the hill again, an
endless task repeated in perpetuity.
The myth of Sisyphus has become a metaphor in modem times for utter
futility ....
Peter C. Ku & William L. LaFuze, Mooting Patent Invalidity: Justiciability and the
Case of Cardinal Chemical, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 539, 539 (1994).
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from dubieties. It is not an equation or a formula repre-
senting a clearly marked process, nor is it an expression of
individual thought to which is imparted the definiteness a
single authorship can give.'
Therefore, rather than attempt the impossible, this Comment
recommends that a broader meaning of involuntary servitude be
developed through case-by-case adjudication as suggested by Jus-
tice Stevens in Kozminski."67 In applying the case-by-case method,
courts should consider the following factors.
1. The focus should be on the conduct of the wrongdoer
Because "[t]he essence of a holding in involuntary servitude is
the exercise of control by one individual over another so that the
latter is coerced into laboring for the former,"'" it is the conduct of
the individual attempting to exercise control, which should be the
subject of concern.
Focusing on whether the victim had alternatives or whether
the victim's conduct was voluntary should be of no consequence.
As Justice Brennan pointed out. in Kozminski:
In some minimalist sense the laborer always has a choice
no matter what the threat: the laborer can choose to
work, or take a beating; work, or go to jail. We can all
agree that these choices are so illegitimate that any deci-
sion to work is "involuntary."... [O]ur task is not to re-
solve the philosophical meaning of free will, but to de-
termine what coercion Congress would have regarded as
sufficient to deem any resulting labor "involuntary" .... 
169
Therefore, in a case like Flood v. Kuhn,' it should be of no impor-
tance that Curtis Flood could "retire and.., embark upon a dif-
ferent enterprise outside organized baseball. 17'
166. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 527,528 (1947).
167. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1452 (1984).
169. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 959 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170. 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), affd on
other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
171. Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 281.
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2. The conduct to be prohibited is the
use of threats to coerce labor
"A holding in involuntary servitude occurs when an individual
coerces another into his service. 72  Coercion is the act of
"compelling by force or arms or threat."' 3
[T]he effect of [a] threat is that the recipient of [the]
threat is much less inclined to act as she would have ab-
sent the threat-generally out of fear. Fear is the calcu-
lation of expected harm and the decision to avoid it. Rea-
sonably prudent individuals will not, without a sufficiently
expected possibility of gain, risk harm. The first thing
wrong with... threats then is that, for the reasonable per-
son, it ... takes a very good reason to resist the threat,
whereas no such strength of reasoning was required be-
fore 174
The type of harm threatened can vary. Besides threats of physical
or legal harm, the courts have, in other circumstances, recognized
the coercive effect of a threat of economic harm.'75 However, the
harm threatened need not be "improper or wrongful" as suggested
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Mussry. 76
Rather, the focus should be on the use of the threat to compel la-
bor. To illustrate, consider Bobilin v. Board of Education,177 in
which the threatened harm was suspension from school for failure
to perform cafeteria duty.1'7 A school has, within its disciplinary
power, the right to suspend a student from school. However, when
this non-wrongful action is used to compel a student to perform
uncompensated labor, it should be prohibited. "The crucial factor
[should be] whether a person intends to and does coerce an indi-
vidual into his service by subjugating the will of the other per-
son,"179 not whether the threatened harm was or was not harmful.
172. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
173. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (6th ed. 1990).
174. Larry May and John C. Hughes, Is Sexual Harassment Coercive?, in MORAL
RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 115, 117 (Gertrude Ezorsky & James W. Nickel eds.,
1987).
175. See, e.g., Karabian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that threatened economic loss is sufficiently coercive conduct to establish a prima
facie case of sexual harassment under Title VII).
176. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
177. 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975).
178. See id. at 1097.
179. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
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3. There are no exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment stating that
"[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within
the United States,"'"8 is unconditional. It provides for no public
service, educational, or other exception. "A judge must not re-
write a statute, neither to enlarge not to contract it. Whatever
temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely sug-
gest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He
must not read in by way of creation." 81
The plain intent [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was to
abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its
badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of
bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control
by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
coerced for another's benefit.'2
When deciding cases, "the purpose which a court must effectuate
is not that which Congress should have enacted, or would have. It
is that which it did enact .... 18
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether slavery was considered a "'necessary evil ' ' 84 or a
"'positive good"'' 85 in the past, it is clear that today slavery and in-
voluntary servitude in the United States, in all forms, are no longer
to be tolerated.
This Comment should not be interpreted as arguing against
voluntary community service; nor should this Comment be read to
say that the goals of mandatory community service are not worth-
while. There may be value in teaching students practical skills and
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
181. Frankfurter, supra note 166, at 533.
182. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,240 (1911).
183. Frankfurter, supra note 166, at 539.
184. BATTY & PARISH, supra note 15, at 21.
185. Id. See also James Oakes, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
SLAVEHOLDERS 5 (1982) (explaining that some anti-abolitionist southerners argued
that slavery was "good for the slaves"). Pro-slavery advocates attempted to justify
the existence of slavery on a number of grounds, including such arguments as: slav-
ery was a positive good providing food, shelter, and rescuing slaves from the "savage
ways" of their homeland, see DELIA RAY, A NATION TORN: THE STORY OF HOW THE
CIVIL WAR BEGAN 33 (1990); STAMPP, supra note 95, at 11; slavery was constitu-
tional, see William Ingersoll Bowditch, The U.S. Constitution Supports Slavery, in
SLAVERY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 213 (William Dudley, ed. 1992); and that slavery
was sanctioned by the Bible, see BATTY & PARRISH, supra note 15, at 21.
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allowing them to gain "real life" work experience. These goals,
however, can and must be achieved without violating the tenets of
the Constitution. No matter how laudable the ends to be accom-
plished, they cannot be accomplished through illegal means."'
What this Comment argues is that mandatory community
service, a system by which a school forces its students to perform
uncompensated labor for approved groups-hallmarks of
"slavelike conditions" 1 -- by threatening to withhold a student's
diploma, is obnoxious and repulsive to the spirit of the Thirteenth
Amendment and its prohibition against involuntary servitude. A
court, giving full recognition to the Thirteenth Amendment's pro-
tections, must hold that mandatory community service is involun-
tary servitude and thus that mandatory community service is ille-
gal.
Bradley H. Kreshek*
186. Presumably, a school may fashion a program that does not run afoul of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
187. See United States v. Kozminski, 486 U.S. 931, 962 (1988) (Brennan, J. con-
curring) (slavelike conditions include lack of pay and lack of personal freedom).
* I would like to thank Professor David W. Burcham of Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles for his assistance with this Comment. Additionally, I would like to
thank Professor Christopher N. May of Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, and Mr. Scott G. Bullock, Esq.
of the Institute for Justice, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 200 South, Wash-
ington, DC 20004. (202) 457-4240. Mr. Bullock was the lead counsel for the plain-
tiffs in Steirer, Immediato, and Herndon.
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